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WHO DECIDES WHAT NUMBER OF CHILDREN IS 
―RIGHT‖? 
June Carbone* 
I agree with Professors Cahn and Collins that ―eight is enough.‖1  I am 
perhaps more skeptical than they are about assisting Nadya Suleman, a 
mother who already has six children, to have more.  I wonder whose funds 
financed fertility treatments for a single, unemployed mom on disability 
benefits, and, perhaps even more critically, who will fund the children‘s 
ongoing care.  I am certainly concerned about the dubious ethical standards 
of the doctor who provided the reproductive care.  But I also have serious 
reservations about anyone choosing to impose my views—or those of oth-
ers—on the country as a whole. 
I therefore applaud Professors Cahn and Collins for leading with the 
question, ―Should we regulate?‖ and for framing their proposals in the con-
text of a principled distinction between regulations of the type that tend to 
be federally regulated in other contexts (how many embryos to implant in a 
single in vitro procedure, for example) and personal decisions better left to 
individual autonomy (such as whether a single mother ought to have more 
children).  I fear, however, that although the distinction they draw is prin-
cipled and in many ways persuasive, it is a line unlikely to stick and unlike-
ly to fully address the ethical framework for reproductive technologies if in 
fact it does take hold. 
My concerns do not proceed from any reflexive libertarianism.  I do 
not reject government regulations per se, nor do I believe that the market, 
through the magic of the unseen hand, will necessarily correct misguided 
decisions to implant six embryos in an unemployed thirty-two-year old.  In-
stead, I question the framework Cahn and Collins develop for determining 
when and what type of regulation is appropriate.  I argue for a dynamic 
theory of regulation, informed by the concept of evolutionary economics, 
that would ask not just what kind of regulations are needed, but also how 
regulatory implementation is likely to affect who becomes a patient, what 
kinds of doctors are likely to provide the services they seek, and where and 
when medical treatment is likely to occur.  This analysis is dynamic—and 
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how change in one arena, such as the expansion of insurance coverage, 
might affect another area, such as the number of embryos likely to be im-
planted or the need to regulate issues not of concern in today‘s fertility 
practices.  In short, I am more concerned about whether fertility clinics lo-
cate in Detroit or Windsor, whether President Obama or a Georgia governor 
appoints the regulators, and whether Ms. Suleman can afford in vitro fertili-
zation at all than I am with having a government official stop the next doc-
tor willing to implant too many embryos. 
I. STATIC REGULATION: BAD MOTHERS, GREEDY DOCTORS, AND 
CHILDREN AS EXTERNALITIES 
Two types of discourses justify regulation—and both tend to be rela-
tively ―static‖ forms of analysis.  That is, they diagnose a problem, explain 
why the existing decision-makers are unlikely to get it right, and then pro-
pose regulation as the solution, without comparing the differences between 
how a regulated versus unregulated system might evolve over time.  The 
first of these forms of analysis, grounded in bioethics, informs Cahn‘s and 
Collins‘s arguments.  It proceeds from the premise that medical decision-
making should respect patient autonomy.2  It then justifies restrictions on 
that autonomy in terms of the interests of third parties—the children of re-
productive technology and the public who may ultimately pay for their 
care—that are otherwise unrepresented in private decisions between doctors 
and prospective parents.3   
The second discourse parallels the first.  Conventional economic anal-
ysis also justifies regulation when market decisions impose costs on third 
parties.4  The economic analysis focuses on ―greedy‖ doctors; they may 
gain patients if their success in producing babies improves, but if birth de-
fects also increase, they do not report or bear the consequences of the de-
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especially those who have already undergone unsuccessful fertility treat-
ments, who may discount the risk of birth defects due to their fear that they 
will have no children at all and their concern that they will be unable to af-
ford additional rounds of in vitro fertilization if the current effort fails.6  The 
discourse concludes that children with birth defects are ―externalities‖—the 
doctor and prospective parent who make decisions in the current system 
about how many embryos to implant do not bear the full costs (and there-
fore do not internalize) the costs of the birth defects that may result from 
multiples.7  Because private decision-making cannot fully account for all of 
the interests affected by reproductive technologies, it should not be trusted 
to regulate the field. 
Once this analysis has been conducted—once Cahn and Collins, for 
example, balance ―an individual‘s interest in becoming a parent‖ against 
―society‘s interests in healthy children‖ and conclude that the number of 
embryos to be implanted should be limited8—the discussion usually ends.  I 
give Cahn and Collins credit for their suggestion that with greater regula-
tion should come more assistance with financing, and for their proposal for 
more generous insurance coverage.  I am also impressed that they consider 
the possibilities that more regulation will either go beyond the limits they 
set or inspire a flight to less regulated locales.  What their analysis does not 
do, however, is create a dynamic framework for considering the implica-
tions of their regulatory approach.   
II. DYNAMIC REGULATION: GEORGIA ON MY MIND 
A dynamic approach to regulation would ask not just whether regula-
tion can be justified, but also how the adoption of regulation may transform 
the nature of the transactions being regulated, and how that transformation 
might compare with the continued evolution of the unregulated market.  
Evolutionary economics, which sees markets as complex adaptive systems 
that change over time through a process of trial and error, provides tools 
that can be used to consider what the process might look like.9  Evolutio-
nary analysis differs from other forms of dynamic analysis10 in that it focus-
es, in particular, on the mechanisms that produce variation and the 
processes likely to select and reinforce some variants over others.  Accor-
dingly, such analysis considers the creation of reinforcing virtuous and vi-
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cious cycles,11 and pays particular attention to how a particular regulation 
will change the composition of who (agents such as doctors and patients), 
what (processes), where (jurisdictions), and when the affected activities oc-
cur.  Ironically, considered in terms of evolutionary economics, Cahn‘s and 
Collins‘s almost offhand suggestion of expanded insurance coverage be-
comes significantly more important than the proposals to limit the number 
of embryos, because expanded insurance is more likely to change the mix 
of patients, doctors, and regulators involved with treatment.  To explain, I 
reverse the order of analysis, starting with the question of where regulation 
is likely to be enacted, and how it may affect where fertility treatments oc-
cur. 
A. Where? 
Deliberations in the Georgia legislature on a bill to limit the number of 
embryos implanted illustrate the concerns that underlie Cahn‘s and Col-
lins‘s approach.  Senator Ralph Hudgens, a Georgia legislator known for his 
anti-abortion stance, introduced the legislation, with comments on Suleman: 
―She is not married . . . .  She is unemployed, she is on government assis-
tance and now she is going to put those 14 children on the back of the tax-
payers in the state of California.‖12  Critics characterized the bill, which 
would have both limited the number of embryos implanted (two for women 
younger than forty) and restricted the use of embryos in stem cell research, 
as a backdoor effort to outlaw abortion.  Fertility industry lobbyists quickly 
derailed the measure, emphasizing that it would increase costs and decrease 
success rates.  One Atlanta fertility doctor, for example, told the press, 
―What this bill will effectively do is shut us down . . . .  Patients seeking re-
productive care in Georgia will go to Tennessee or South Carolina or Ala-
bama.  They will just leave.‖13  
The Georgia debate underscores the fact that fertility treatments take 
place in a decentralized, competitive industry—and that legislatures re-
spond to a variety of constituents who may not necessarily have infant 
health as their primary concern.  Doctors implant multiple embryos because 
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tial success rates lower costs.14  If the Georgia legislation had the effect of 
either lowering the success rates or raising the costs of Georgia clinics, they 
would lose out to clinics elsewhere.  Indeed, some clinics already have mul-
tiple offices in different states and even different countries, and could easily 
shift their practices to other jurisdictions to accommodate the demand.15  
Accordingly, even regulation at the national level, if it made U.S. clinics 
less competitive, could simply fuel the movement of more clinics to the Ca-
ribbean.  
Cahn and Collins propose increasing insurance coverage expressly to 
deal with that concern.  They reason that if insurance coverage makes mul-
tiple cycles more affordable, it will make regulation limiting the number of 
embryos implanted more feasible.16  Indeed, empirical evidence suggests 
that greater insurance coverage may prompt fewer high-order multiples 
even without express limitations.17  They are right that a change in the 
source of financing may facilitate effective oversight of the number of em-
bryos implanted, but the tail is wagging the dog.  Comprehensive insurance 
coverage has dramatically further-reaching implications than a restriction 
on the number of embryos to be implanted.  A proposal for more extensive 
insurance coverage should therefore stand or fall on its own merits.  Let us 
start an investigation of the issues expanded insurance coverage might raise 
with the question of where it is to be made available. 
Today, regulation of medical procedures takes place at the national 
level, but insurance regulation is a state activity.  Some states already com-
pel coverage for fertility treatments, or require that employers at least offer 
such coverage.18  These regulations, however, cannot be comprehensive be-
cause, among other things, they vary in what they cover and are often 
preempted by federal legislation.  Therefore, the regulations do not cover all 
health plans even in those states in which they apply.19   
To be effective, insurance coverage would have to be mandated na-
tionally.  Yet, in vitro fertilization involves expenses that can start at be-
tween $10,000 and $15,000 per cycle, cost up to $100,000 per patient, 
address the needs of only a small percentage of women with infertility is-
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are more likely to defer childbearing and are the most likely to seek out 
treatment).20  The justification for such coverage, particularly without com-
prehensive health care reform, has to be based on something more than a 
desire to regulate the number of embryos implanted more effectively. 
B. What? 
Underlying Cahn‘s and Collins‘s approach is a sensible notion: more 
extensive regulation should lead to more extensive subsidies.  Right now, 
the fertility industry rests on an implicit tradeoff.  On the one hand, we lack 
comprehensive regulation in part because whenever restrictions are pro-
posed that might command consensus, such as some limit on the number of 
embryos implanted, the debate quickly expands, as it did in Georgia, to in-
clude intractable issues such as the moral status of the embryo or limits on 
reproductive access for single women.21  On the other hand, with little regu-
lation—and no subsidy—the industry is limited to wealthier (and relatively 
sophisticated) patients and doctors in small practices willing to forego the 
more secure income that comes with insurance coverage.22  These doctors 
and patients operate largely below the public radar (at least until a Nadya 
Suleman garners publicity) with limited oversight.  The result is a flourish-
ing industry in which many clinics discriminate against same-sex couples, 
AIDS sufferers, and single men, while others cater specifically to gays and 
lesbians, and others still aid anyone who walks in the door—and can pay.23  
It is also an innovative industry that often experiments with new techniques 
earlier than other places in the world.  Nonetheless, as Jaime King observes: 
 
The absence of federal research funding has pushed repro-
ductive genetics out of the laboratory and into medical 
practice.  Advances in reproductive technology, such as 
PGS [preimplantation genetic screening], have been widely 
achieved on the basis of theory-driven rather than data-
driven hypotheses, given the lack of funds for research and 
the absence of legislation that requires safety and efficacy 
research prior to clinical use.  As a result, couples often 
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safety and efficacy, and policymakers have little data to 
suggest a need for regulation.24 
 
Cahn‘s and Collins‘s proposal to expand insurance coverage rejects 
this tradeoff.  They write that ―[i]nfertility is one of the most difficult life 
challenges an individual can encounter, and we believe we must do more to 
facilitate access to treatment.‖25  But why, what, and for whom?  I am sym-
pathetic to the claim that insurance coverage should extend to reproductive 
procedures on at least the same basis as the coverage of Viagra as a matter 
of basic equality for women.  Nonetheless, I am bothered at least as much 
as Senator Hudgens by the prospect that my health insurance premiums 
might rise in order to cover fertility treatments for a woman who already 
has six children, and though I agree with Cahn and Collins that the govern-
ment should not restrict the ability of any man or woman to reproduce, I am 
not so sure that insurance funds should be available irrespective of ―preex-
isting family size, the financial resources available to care for any children 
born as a result of ART, or the marital status or sexual orientation of poten-
tial patients.‖26  Moreover, with mandated insurance coverage and no addi-
tional funds for research, the question of what treatments will be covered, 
and which deemed experimental, will likely become more intense.27   
Current regulations restricting the implantation of multiple embryos 
rest on the health implications for the children that may result from in vitro 
procedures.  Extending insurance coverage to fertility treatments on a com-
prehensive basis at either the federal or the state level necessarily involves a 
more complex calculus—such regulation must also consider whose repro-
duction should be subsidized (or more accurately cross-subsidized by those 
contributing to the premiums).  And if the interests of children can be taken 
into account in making a decision about overseeing medical procedures, 
why should the interests of taxpayers (or other healthcare consumers) not be 
considered in deciding whose reproduction should not only be tolerated, but 
encouraged and paid for by others? 
C. Who? 
Comprehensive funding for reproductive technologies must address the 
types of technologies that should be encouraged, and defining types of cov-
erage raises the issue of for whom they should be encouraged.  The issue of 
―who,‖ as the subject rather than the object of the sentence, however, raises 
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change the dynamics of the industry in fundamental ways, and it would do 
so in large part because it would change the character of the medical prac-
tice, the patients, and the level of oversight appropriate and possible for 
both.   
First, consider the doctors.  With comprehensive insurance coverage, 
fertility physicians, once considered the cowboys of the medical profes-
sion,28 would become much more like other doctors.  On the one hand, this 
should make them more responsive to professional norms.  On the other 
hand, it may also make them more risk averse when dealing with controver-
sial patients.  Doctors who willingly treat single women today, for example, 
might hesitate to do so if they were associated with a religious or communi-
ty hospital embarrassed by the association with an unemployed single 
mother, even one who gives birth to a single child instead of octuplets.29 
Second, the effects of broader insurance coverage would vary with 
changes in the composition of the patient group.  Existing insurance man-
dates appear not to have increased access to ART to a significant degree, 
apparently because those with access to employer-funded health insurance 
already have the resources to pay for treatment.30  If Cahn‘s and Collins‘s 
reforms are similar in scope to those already existing in some states, the net 
effect would be to disproportionately benefit the most advantaged of those 
already using fertility services.  If, on the other hand, the reforms succeeded 
in expanding the patient population, many people who today would not 
consider fertility treatments because they could not afford them would seek 
access, increasing the importance of issues that may be of less concern to-
day.  For example, an expanded patient group might be less sophisticated 
than the current one, raising the need for more consumer protection meas-
ures.  Or, it might be less healthy, raising issues about the effectiveness of 
treatment.31   
Third, a new set of actors will be introduced into the ART process—
most notably, insurance companies.  Insurance companies will likely want 
to restrict eligibility, as they already do with respect to existing policies, ar-
guing that ―(1) infertility is not an ‗illness‘; (2) artificial insemination is not 
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that specific treatments are experimental.32  Moreover, insurers are likely to 
define single women and same-sex partners as not suffering from an illness 
and therefore not eligible for coverage.  The more that access depends on 
insurance coverage and the more that it becomes a matter of routine for 
some, the more that coverage for others is likely to become a matter of con-
tention. 
All this suggests that a subsidized industry, whether subsidized directly 
or through insurance premiums, will be one with different doctors, different 
patients, and different regulatory issues than the one that exists today.  Cahn 
and Collins raise the concern that ―opening the door to any kind of govern-
ment interference in fertility treatments will also open the door to restric-
tions on ART access . . . .‖33  In a transformed industry, however, decisions 
about access will be inevitable.  Private clinics often discriminate now, but 
the refusal by any given clinic to treat a patient does not necessarily result 
in a total denial of care.  For many, however, the denial of insurance cover-
age would preclude treatment, and give rise to calls for more legislation to 
prohibit—or impose—such limitations.  What are now small-scale private 
decisions will become large, publicly debated ones, carrying higher stakes 
for the patient.34  
D. When? 
Finally, any substantial expansion of medical insurance coverage in the 
context of a U.S. health care system that does not provide basic coverage 
for millions of Americans is likely to be exceptionally controversial.  Ac-
cordingly, a comprehensive proposal should be evaluated in the context of 
the Obama Administration‘s overall approach to comprehensive health care 
reform.  The costs of such an expansion in coverage would almost certainly 
be weighed in terms of the affordability of other reforms—but overall pro-
vision for health care is the context in which these regulatory decisions take 
place, and it is the appropriate framework for such decisionmaking.   
III. CONCLUSION: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST POLICIES? 
Cahn and Collins are right to connect proposals for the regulation of 
assisted reproduction with expansions in mandated insurance coverage and 
limitations on the ability of doctors to determine their patients‘ ability to re-
produce.  They are certainly correct that the issues are intertwined, and that 
changes in one area will increase the importance of changes in the other 
areas.  They are also right that the American failure to systematically ad-
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the abuses that result from an industry with so little oversight is inexcusa-
ble. 
At the same time, once the combination of expanded insurance cover-
age and systematic regulation is in place, the implications will be far broad-
er than regulating how many embryos to implant.  Left untouched in this 
discussion are such controversial issues as how and when to allow the adop-
tion of new procedures.  Will the new regulations, for example, permit use 
of preimplantation genetic diagnosis not only to determine potential diseas-
es, but also to increase the chances of a successful pregnancy?35  Will the 
government help fund studies to determine the safety of new procedures?  
Will it address the storage, donation, and destruction of embryos—a politi-
cally incendiary issue in many legislatures?   
The largest criticism I have of the Cahn and Collins argument is that 
their suggestion that we should regulate the number of embryos implanted 
is far too narrow a framework in which to decide whether to go down the 
path of comprehensive insurance financing and public regulation—a path 
that will transform the dynamics of the industry.  The issue of embryo im-
plantation may be one where the current world of lightly regulated practices 
works much better than press accounts indicate.  As evidence that voluntary 
professional regulation is inadequate, Cahn and Collins cite statistics that 
4% of IVF cycles still involve implantation of four or more embryos.36  
What they do not say is that for women under the age of thirty-five, the per-
cent receiving four or more has fallen from 64% of IVF cycles in 1996 to 
3% in 2006.  The number of triplets implanted also fell from a high of 50% 
in 1998 to 16% in 2006, while the number of singleton implantations has 
risen from the de minimis level to 7%.37  In other words, the current unregu-
lated world of fertility practice is not static.  Despite the incentives to im-
plant multiple embryos, professional guidelines and the shift in medical 
practices have done a remarkable job in reducing the number of multiples 
who result from assisted reproduction.  Suleman‘s octuplets are the outliers; 
the difficult issue is that 75% of implantations are with two embryos,38 un-
dertaken, in part, because many fertility patients want twins.39  I am dubious 
whether it is worth the transformation of the entire industry in order to limit 
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Instead, I would like to see the debate over financing reform conducted 
on terms of its own in accordance with an evolutionary analysis that takes 
into account the forces such measures are likely to unleash.  Cahn and Col-
lins are clearly troubled by the inequalities in access to fertility treatments.  
Broadening access as part of wholesale health care reform is a worthy ob-
jective, and it should be proposed together with calls for greater regulation.  
If more comprehensive financing were to become available, greater over-
sight would become easier, and to some degree inevitable.  It would still 
leave room, however, for an intense—and I suspect quite different—debate 
on how to decide how many children are ―enough.‖ 
